TY Gagne's new book is out (Spoiler Alert!)

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As someone who's been exclusively a day hiker for over 30 years now, I probably carry only around 20 lbs on a typical hike, most of which is water. What is a typical load for a backpacker? 75 lbs sounded really extreme to me too. Kind of like trying to carry a piano up the mountain. Plus he was breaking trail in the snow most of the way. No wonder the guy was totally spent.

I forget if it was this book or his first book but there was a section that described what each SAR team was required to carry. They basically have to be ready to spend the night out themselves and the potential victim(s) so I think they have a shelter, carry hot liquids, medical supplies you probably wouldn't carry, duplicate clothes for the victims and all kinds of other stuff. Even with state of the art gear I'd imagine it is hard to keep the weight down packing for two or possibly more people. Makes their efforts all the more incredible.
 
There is or was a YouTube video of FIsh and Game officer going through the contents of his pack. One of the big surprises from the Kate book was the section where a couple of the rescue folks had a real tough time starting their butane powered stoves. That threw me given the limitations of butane in winter. It also surprised me that the author did not comment about it.
 
There is or was a YouTube video of FIsh and Game officer going through the contents of his pack. One of the big surprises from the Kate book was the section where a couple of the rescue folks had a real tough time starting their butane powered stoves. That threw me given the limitations of butane in winter. It also surprised me that the author did not comment about it.

Are you questioning the choice of fuel? I don't know much about cold weather stove operation or if butane is bad in extreme cold but I always assumed the issue lighting the stoves was the high winds. Been awhile since I've read that book though so I don't remember the context.
 
I gave away my copy but if I remember correctly during the initial evening search when they were heading from Valley Way to the false coordinate on Watson path they were in need of a stove and the butane canisters were so cold that they would not vaporize, after some delay they found one canister that would work that was buried deep in one of the rescuers backpacks. Generally liquid fueled stoves are recommended for cold conditions due this vaporization issue.
 
Butane boils at 31°. Isobutane boils at 11°. Below those temps the only thing burning is the propane in the mixture.
 
Butane boils at 31°. Isobutane boils at 11°. Below those temps the only thing burning is the propane in the mixture.

Warming the canisters is a real PITA but can be managed. I always felt it safer to use a canister stove for in-tent cooking rather than liquid fuel.
 
Keep it in perspective this was a situation that occurred over 10 yeas ago. Gear has changed. Still nothing like Coleman Fuel though when you need the Stoke......Then and Now!
 
Warming the canisters is a real PITA but can be managed. I always felt it safer to use a canister stove for in-tent cooking rather than liquid fuel.

I use an inverted canister stove in the Winter. Too convenient not to. It can be converted to gasoline, if I ever get around to it.
 
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1. SVEA 123R, nuf said.

2. I would be a nervous wreck with an open flame inside a tent. I would have to go buy an MSR reactor in a hanging setup to even consider it. Obviously, I am not camping above treeline in foul weather..

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I think we have covered the pros and cons of gaseous and liquid fuels for cold weather in the past and suggest that we drift on back to the book ;) (tempting as it is to drift away on a favorite subject)
 
I think we have covered the pros and cons of gaseous and liquid fuels for cold weather in the past and suggest that we drift on back to the book ;) (tempting as it is to drift away on a favorite subject)

Yes, like perhaps the point when the two hikers reach the top of Little Haystack, behind schedule, in worsening conditions, lacking essential gear and without an overnight contingency plan, and decide to proceed along the ridge towards Lincoln. Few others have ventured out on this day in deference to the extreme cold, high winds, and even worse forecast. Even fewer have proceeded above treeline and the few that have done so have all turned back to safety.
 
I agree with all that has been said so far. And I'm also curious Sierra what made you un-order the book? I haven't seen the lecture you referenced. I thought the book was simply outstanding, even more gripping and informative for me than WYFM.

I too was surprised that members of the SAR crew did not have definitive navigation equipment, such as a dedicated GPS unit. They were widely available well before 2008. I wonder if that is one item they've made requisite since this operation? Still, the human element within SAR teams was once again very well described and enlightening. BTW, my winter kit for a presi-traverse backpack is about 50 lbs, including food and water but no technical climbing gear. That's just for a single person, but my gear also is the cheap stuff. 75 lbs seems on the heavy side by about 10-15 lbs, depending on lots of things. But I'm no expert. The physical fitness from Ober and Martel/Dupuis is truly remarkable.

I was living in CA at the time of this particular accident and don't remember hearing anything about it (in contrast to the Matrasova story, which I knew just about every detail of well before that book was published). [Spoiler alert] The combination of details from a survivor and candid details from the SAR crews made this book truly exceptional, in my opinion. I've felt so many of the feelings that were described: sudden changes in weather when you're above treeline; panic when you realize you're in it fairly deep; deference to a 'leader', the way Osborne deferred to Frederickson; social pressure when you're less experienced than others in a group; being absolutely gassed under a heavy pack and/or a much longer than expected day. The list goes on. This book made me want to barf on several occasions.
 
I agree with all that has been said so far. And I'm also curious Sierra what made you un-order the book? I haven't seen the lecture you referenced. I thought the book was simply outstanding, even more gripping and informative for me than WYFM.

I too was surprised that members of the SAR crew did not have definitive navigation equipment, such as a dedicated GPS unit. They were widely available well before 2008. I wonder if that is one item they've made requisite since this operation? Still, the human element within SAR teams was once again very well described and enlightening. BTW, my winter kit for a presi-traverse backpack is about 50 lbs, including food and water but no technical climbing gear. That's just for a single person, but my gear also is the cheap stuff. 75 lbs seems on the heavy side by about 10-15 lbs, depending on lots of things. But I'm no expert. The physical fitness from Ober and Martel/Dupuis is truly remarkable.

I was living in CA at the time of this particular accident and don't remember hearing anything about it (in contrast to the Matrasova story, which I knew just about every detail of well before that book was published). [Spoiler alert] The combination of details from a survivor and candid details from the SAR crews made this book truly exceptional, in my opinion. I've felt so many of the feelings that were described: sudden changes in weather when you're above treeline; panic when you realize you're in it fairly deep; deference to a 'leader', the way Osborne deferred to Frederickson; social pressure when you're less experienced than others in a group; being absolutely gassed under a heavy pack and/or a much longer than expected day. The list goes on. This book made me want to barf on several occasions.

Two reasons. Number 1, I was around when this happened and was very familiar with the details already. Number 2, after hearing the lecture, I just wasn't interested in the book. Not to sound conceited, but the issues at hand that caused this incident are not that interesting to me, to read all the details again in book form. Personally, I think this whole incident could have been avoided by hauling ass back down FW when they had the chance. A mistake commonly made by many, not having the situational awareness to make a critical decision at the right time.
 
Two reasons. Number 1, I was around when this happened and was very familiar with the details already. Number 2, after hearing the lecture, I just wasn't interested in the book. Not to sound conceited, but the issues at hand that caused this incident are not that interesting to me, to read all the details again in book form. Personally, I think this whole incident could have been avoided by hauling ass back down FW when they had the chance. A mistake commonly made by many, not having the situational awareness to make a critical decision at the right time.
Got it, that makes sense. Your thought about getting back down FW at whatever the cost, even if they had to crawl half a mile to get there, was exactly my thought when I got to that part of the story. I won't second guess their decision making as none of us can really know what we'd do since we weren't there, and I really do appreciate Osbourne's candor in telling the story. But all I kept thinking was, if you don't get below treeline, this is going to go poorly. If you can still make progress crawling, then crawl.

Incidentally, a similar idea was suggested to me a long time ago in an AMC workshop at Cardigan. It was a role play, and the scenario was broken leg above treeline in the northern Presidentials in winter in heavy conditions. I drew 'leader' for the scenario, and my idea was to carry the victim behind a rock, and then makeshift-splint the leg in whatever way we could in 5 minutes or less. Then place the victim on a pad and drag until we were below treeline. On discussion, the person leading the scenario believed in these circumstances the most likely outcomes were either the victim would die or the whole group would die, but some loss of life was highly probably. I'm not sure I completely buy that, but every time I venture above treeline in winter now, I constantly consider what would happen if I or another group member became completely immobilized. If the answer is 'someone probably will die' I think very carefully about my next move. The exercise does make you constantly consider what is the shortest escape route, how short is that escape route, and what does it take to get there. I think Fred and James were more committed than they realized, but I suspect if they knew death was likely if they stayed, they'd have figured out a way to keep moving.
 
I think Sierra and HikerBrian may be thinking about two different time frames. I got the impression that Sierra meant they should have turned around no later than when they first reached the summit of Little Haystack, when conditions were poor-ish (but still hikable) and they should have known they had no chance of beating the forecast. Hikerbrian is talking about what they might have done after the first mighty gust, once they knew they were in critical trouble.

As long as we're back-seat quarterbacking (I realize friends and family, not to mention the survivor himself, may read this, and I want to make clear I don't claim any particular authority), I basically agree with Brian. My preference, after the gust, would be to to head to Little Haystack. If you can't find the trail entrance to Falling Waters right away, continue south and get below treeline on the trail toward Liberty and Flume. That's an easy trail to find even in winter. It might not be broken out, but being south of the peak and below treeline, you'd be out of the worst of the wind, and you'd have deep snow and lots of wood for making shelter and fire. Once out of the wind you could assess your next options: build a shelter and spend the night in place, look again for Falling Waters, try to make it to Liberty Spring trail?
To me the most remarkable part of the story is how well they did once they chose the option of sheltering above treeline. They both survived through the night, and were able to walk at least a little way in the morning. Given their relatively meager gear (_for the conditions_), that's pretty amazing. It goes to show that the choice was not an easy one. How long did they spend to find that shelter? Would the time have been better spent trying to head south, or would they have run out of time while still fully exposed on the ridge? If they chose the "head south" option, they could have been pinned down by the wind with no shelter at all; they could simply have frozen on their feet; they might have taken a wrong turn or suffered a broken ankle. No guarantees either way.
 
Got it, that makes sense. Your thought about getting back down FW at whatever the cost, even if they had to crawl half a mile to get there, was exactly my thought when I got to that part of the story. I won't second guess their decision making as none of us can really know what we'd do since we weren't there, and I really do appreciate Osbourne's candor in telling the story. But all I kept thinking was, if you don't get below treeline, this is going to go poorly. If you can still make progress crawling, then crawl.

Incidentally, a similar idea was suggested to me a long time ago in an AMC workshop at Cardigan. It was a role play, and the scenario was broken leg above treeline in the northern Presidentials in winter in heavy conditions. I drew 'leader' for the scenario, and my idea was to carry the victim behind a rock, and then makeshift-splint the leg in whatever way we could in 5 minutes or less. Then place the victim on a pad and drag until we were below treeline. On discussion, the person leading the scenario believed in these circumstances the most likely outcomes were either the victim would die or the whole group would die, but some loss of life was highly probably. I'm not sure I completely buy that, but every time I venture above treeline in winter now, I constantly consider what would happen if I or another group member became completely immobilized. If the answer is 'someone probably will die' I think very carefully about my next move. The exercise does make you constantly consider what is the shortest escape route, how short is that escape route, and what does it take to get there. I think Fred and James were more committed than they realized, but I suspect if they knew death was likely if they stayed, they'd have figured out a way to keep moving.

We think alike, that is always my mantra. About 25 years ago, I was descending Washington solo in December. Right below the summit of Lions head, I came upon a small group. One guy lying on the ground had just snapped his ankle. It was cold and windy, good snowpack. They did not know what to do. I got down and looked at the guy, he was already shivering. One of them said, I'm going for help, I said go ahead but he cant wait, your talking hours, he doesn't have that much time, he will be hypothermic in one hour. Just then a climber walks by, I said I need your rope, he said ok. I tied the rope around this guys waist, then I started lowering him and sometimes dragging him. Back then I was pretty damn fit. I would lower him about 20ft, then get down to him, over and over. When he banged his leg, he let out a blood curdling cry, lol. It took me two hours to get him on the flat section near the Tucks trail. At that point the FS showed up with the litter. I stayed on to help and we took him down the Shelburne trail to the ambulance. Funny thing is, not one of them said thank you. I shrugged and went to a bar in NC. It was a fun day.
 
I constantly consider what would happen if ...

I think that is ultimately the most important part of risk analysis. I think it was in "Mountaineering:Freedom Of The Hills" or some similar book that drills this point home over and over. Whenever something about the trip changes this should be the first question that pops into your head. Something may be very unlikely to happen...but what if it does? You need to be prepared for that "if" and the consequences associated with "then x happens" before proceeding. Otherwise it's time for Plan B. I think people frequently confuse the odds of something happening versus the consequences of what happens.
 
I think that is ultimately the most important part of risk analysis. I think it was in "Mountaineering:Freedom Of The Hills" or some similar book that drills this point home over and over. Whenever something about the trip changes this should be the first question that pops into your head. Something may be very unlikely to happen...but what if it does? You need to be prepared for that "if" and the consequences associated with "then x happens" before proceeding. Otherwise it's time for Plan B. I think people frequently confuse the odds of something happening versus the consequences of what happens.

I think that famous quote by Mike Tyson might apply here: "Everybody's got a plan until the get punched in the mouth."
 
I think that famous quote by Mike Tyson might apply here: "Everybody's got a plan until the get punched in the mouth."

Ah yes but I think the proper approach is to ask yourself, as you're stepping through the ropes, -"What happens if Mike Tyson does punch me in the mouth?". :)
 
Ah yes but I think the proper approach is to ask yourself, as you're stepping through the ropes, -"What happens if Mike Tyson does punch me in the mouth?". :)

Ha! You're probably correct.

My takeaway from the book is: Know the big picture indicated the weather report before you start. And don't bet your life on the exact chronology provided.

Like Kate thees folks hoped to squeeze the hike in before the weather turned nasty. That happened sooner than forecast.
 
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