Avalanche in Huntington Ravine: 3 hurt (Updated Subject line)

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For future reference:

Asked whether the climbers should have been scaling the mountain after darkness, Benna said it would depend on their level of expertise and the gear they carried.

"If you're prepared to be in that type of weather and in darkness, it's a hard thing to say 'should' or 'shouldn't have,'" (Tiffany Benna, public affairs officer for the U.S. Forest Service) said. "I don't know how they were outfitted — if they had headlamps and gear to do a nighttime trip."
 
Remember that all technical climbing involves taking calculated risks and any risk carries the possibility of an accident. Most of us only hear about it when an accident occurs.
Doug

Good point Doug...and people who make bad decisions are only judged when their decisions lead to accidents. This appears, based on the avalanche forecast, to not have been an unreasonable decision to climb. under a "moderate avalanche danger," natural avalanches are unlikely and human triggered avalanches are possible. Climbing under these conditons is not uncommon for experienced climbers (I am not an experienced technical winter climber).

"Moderate" danger is the second "worse" of 5 levels of avalanche danger.

1-low
2-moderate
3-considerable
4-high
5-extreme

It sounds to me, and none of us have all the details, that this is not a case of negligence or necessarily even really poor decision making. It sounds like it was an unfortunate accident. When details of how the slide was started begin to come out, more light may be shed, but it's not like the danger was "high" or even "considerable" for that matter. Do we expect climbers to only go on days listed as "1" on scale of "5?" This was a "2" day. No one gets judged for climbing on a moderate avalanche danger day when there are no problems.


For future reference:

"If you're prepared to be in that type of weather and in darkness, it's a hard thing to say 'should' or 'shouldn't have,'" (Tiffany Benna, public affairs officer for the U.S. Forest Service) said. "I don't know how they were outfitted — if they had headlamps and gear to do a nighttime trip."

Good eye Tim! This quote, although from USFS and not USF&G, could be useful later on in discussing what consitutes negligence.
 
OMG...don't tell me we are going to start 2nd guessing this one ?
How we would have done it so much better.

Let's see a one legged veteran...oh yeah let's jump all over him as well.
 
OMG...don't tell me we are going to start 2nd guessing this one ?
How we would have done it so much better.

Let's see a one legged veteran...oh yeah let's jump all over him as well.
Vfft seems very tame lately on the attack game.This board in the past seems to have been all over the place on the critique thang towards perceived negligent hikers or accident victims.This thread seems to be very supportive of our fellow hikers and climbers in general.I am not quite a climber so will not comment on this incident.Maybe its ok to have a issue with hikers on rescue matters and still be very supportive of a disabled veteran?
 
Vfft seems very tame lately on the attack game.This board in the past seems to have been all over the place on the critique thang towards perceived negligent hikers or accident victims.This thread seems to be very supportive of our fellow hikers and climbers in general.
<meta comment>
Several of us have actively tried to suppress unjustified "lynch the victim" fests. It seems to have had some lasting effect.
</meta comment>

I am not quite a climber so will not comment on this incident.Maybe its ok to have a issue with hikers on rescue matters and still be very supportive of a disabled veteran?
I used to ice climb and have climbed part way up Central Gully (turned back due to loose ice) and have climbed Pinnacle Gully (just to the left of Central: moderate, NEI 3). Trying to push one's limits is part of mountaineering.

Doug
 
It sounds to me, and none of us have all the details, that this is not a case of negligence or necessarily even really poor decision making. It sounds like it was an unfortunate accident. When details of how the slide was started begin to come out, more light may be shed, but it's not like the danger was "high" or even "considerable" for that matter. Do we expect climbers to only go on days listed as "1" on scale of "5?" This was a "2" day. No one gets judged for climbing on a moderate avalanche danger day when there are no problems.

Good points, but a moderate (or even a "low") forecast doesn't remove the need for people in avalanche terrain to make their own assessments and decisions.
 
Good points, but a moderate (or even a "low") forecast doesn't remove the need for people in avalanche terrain to make their own assessments and decisions.
True, however it is not possible to forecast avalanches with 100% accuracy even if you are standing at the trigger point.

And, in this case, avalanche conditions at the top of the gully appear to have been worse than the conditions lower down (see the Conway Daily Sun article). If those at the top of the gully recognized the increased risk, they were left with the choice of retreating down the line of fire or attempting to push through.

Doug
 
Thom Pollard is going to have as much of this on camera as he could possibly have.

I'm not saying whoop whoop Yea or Nay, or being nasty, just saying that this is going to reach a screen near you, in some form or another.

There was intent to approach, there was planning to approach, there were skills addressed and assigned, there were plans, plans, plans in place.

Their plan went south, but their mission may not be in the least compromised by what actually happened. Just adds the usual WTF.

Every one of us pushes the package, every day, in more ways than we know.

Life is what happens when you were making other plans.

Breeze
 
Here's a link to an article in the Concord Monitor -

I had an opportunity to talk today with one of the state park service personnel who was on the summit at the time of the avalanche.

From Scott's post above:

1-low
2-moderate
3-considerable
4-high
5-extreme

The way I look at this ratings is to think of them posted on the door of my favorite bar. If there was a sign that said - "Your chances of getting shot inside the bar tonight are moderate" - would you go in?

I'm not suggesting that the climbers in question made the wrong decision - not at all. It's way too complicated. What I am reacting to is that somehow, using the above rating, that a 2 is an acceptable level of risk. It may be to some, but not others (myself included).
 
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2-moderate
It may be worth noting that "moderate" is defined as:
Natural avalanches unlikely; human-triggered avalanches possible.
Ref: http://www.mountwashingtonavalanchecenter.org/avalanche-safety/5-scale-danger-scale/

Conditions at the top of the ravine appear to have gotten worse during the day. (Ref: Conway Daily Sun article). It is possible that the local rating would have been higher by the time the first party reached the release zone, had it been rechecked by the snow rangers.

IMO, it is highly likely that the avalanche was triggered by the climbers themselves.


A possible additional factor:
Some with experience in higher ranges may also underestimate the Whites. While the highest peak is only a measly 6288 ft, the weather and snow conditions on the higher peaks can be similar to those of much higher mountains. A meteorologist friend used to compare the base-to-summit differences in the weather of Mt Washington (6288 ft) and Pikes Peak (14,110 ft)--the difference was significantly greater for Mt Washington.

Doug
 
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I found it curious that according to the report, the team had left the cabin at 8:30 and the climb began at 12:30. Even with 12 people and cameras etc, that's quite a long time.

The report also stated that the incident occured at 4:30pm. Although I see no problem with a planned headlamp descent (I've soloed Central by the full moon without ever turning on my headlamp) Lots of stuff can
 
I believe Thom's a local guy, or at least has family here. As DP showed, natural avalanches unlikely, man made possible, its's probably the conditions that are prevalent most days in Tucks, especialy if any snow has fallen the past day or two. (Actually if any decent amount has fallen, it's probably higher)

Thom was also one of camera men on the Mallory - Irvine search back in 1999 that found the climbers and as mentioned has climbed all over world. I suspect some of the SAR mountain volunteers & guides know him.

Other folks on the motivational speaking tour with Washington mishaps, had referred to their experience as "major" peaks in CO and a highpoint of two. Some might consider Elbert & Longs the only two major peaks in CO.
 
I found it curious that according to the report, the team had left the cabin at 8:30 and the climb began at 12:30. Even with 12 people and cameras etc, that's quite a long time.

The report also stated that the incident occured at 4:30pm. Although I see no problem with a planned headlamp descent (I've soloed Central by the full moon without ever turning on my headlamp) Lots of stuff can

I believe the plan was for them to spend the night at the observatory, so no decent that day would have been necessary.
 
Links to other sites with relevant / topical information are fine. What is frowned upon is links for your own personal gain or anything that could be considered OT or spam. In fact we would rather you posted links then copied stories - thus violating copyright law.

Tim
 
Some thoughts, pulling together some threads from what others have written at times. I think of this from the perspective of an AMC leader. What are the conditions? Who are the participants? What time will we finish, and what will the conditions be like then?

1) Despite the fact that whoever was in charge of the operation clearly understood the slow speeds at the party would travel, they left the Harvard high cabin at 8:30 in the morning. Go heavens! At that speed, they should have been out at 5:30am. If they had, they would have been in the spot of the avalanche at 1:30 in afternoon--not that they knew there would be an avalanche, but rather, they would have been in the middle of the climb when the sun was high.

2) But they didn't. They left very late. One has to ask, given it took them four hours to get to the base of Central, didn't anyone suggest they were moving too slowly?

3) The avalanche hazard was what it was, and as JCarter posted earlier, a Moderate danger level, given the size of their party should have set off some bells in someone's head. Look, they flew in from wherever. They hired an expensive cinematographer. They blogged about it in advance. They reserved space at the Observatory. The weather wasn't going to change the day after. Clearly, somebody felt under a lot of pressure to attempt that trip, knowing the conditions were simply terrible, and they had someone who was moving very slowly.

4) Let's assume they completed the climb. That was the easy part! Because on that day, the forecast was for negative temperatures and winds up to seventy miles per hour. Clearly those involved in leading the party, not to mention the staff at the Observatory, knew what that party was in for as they attempted the climb.
WeatherForecast.jpg


This forecast was for Monday, and they were climbing Friday, but it wasn't much different that day.

Somebody clearly had to have been asking themselves if a one-legged climber who took four hours just to get to the base of Central Gully from Harvard High Cabin could have made it to the Observatory in very high winds, sub zero temperatures, and in the dark!

This is the story of a bunch of people who should have known better. They had, after all, professional guides, a North Conway based cinematographer, and were in contact with the Observatory staff, who knew their plan.

That Friday was my birthday, and I had planned a three-day two-night Presi Traverse, and we bagged it because conditions were terrible from Friday through Monday.

I believe they were negligent, virtually from start to finish. You have to respect the Whites and understand that there are simply days when the weather will not cooperate.


Brian
 

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