Mitts
New member
- Joined
- Feb 6, 2009
- Messages
- 16
- Reaction score
- 2
I, like most of this hiking community, have been interested with accidents that happen in the places that I enjoy to spend time playing in. I have come to believe that these accidents are very very rarely the result of a single decision or event, and are more often the result of a series of events and decisions.
These beliefs (and reading Laurence Gonzales' "Deep Survival") have led me to adopt a "red flag" approach to my decision making while hiking. This being making a mental note of situations that might domino and eventually lead to an accident. These red flags could be as simple as not getting as early of a start as planned, to noting a partner's slurred speech or stumbling step. At some point after I have noted enough red flags, I make a decision based on the sum of the things that I've noted throughout the trip, not just the latest negative event.
I recently wrote a paper about Andrew McAuley's fatal kayak trip between Australia and New Zealand, and analyzed some of the decisions he made both before, and during his trip that may have negatively affected the outcome using FMECA. I have long wondered about the feasibility of applying this approach to hiking in the Northeast as a way to develop a set of procedures that could help our community better understand the series of events that lead up to an accident. The paper I wrote, which (hopefully) explains the process more clearly than I have in this post can be read Here.
I'm posting this here in the hope that some of you might be interested in collaboratively developing this analysis for the benefit of our community. I'm also interested on any input or discussion about whether or not this approach would yield realistic information that would be helpful to the average Northeast Hiker. Any and all input is appreciated
-Andrew
These beliefs (and reading Laurence Gonzales' "Deep Survival") have led me to adopt a "red flag" approach to my decision making while hiking. This being making a mental note of situations that might domino and eventually lead to an accident. These red flags could be as simple as not getting as early of a start as planned, to noting a partner's slurred speech or stumbling step. At some point after I have noted enough red flags, I make a decision based on the sum of the things that I've noted throughout the trip, not just the latest negative event.
I recently wrote a paper about Andrew McAuley's fatal kayak trip between Australia and New Zealand, and analyzed some of the decisions he made both before, and during his trip that may have negatively affected the outcome using FMECA. I have long wondered about the feasibility of applying this approach to hiking in the Northeast as a way to develop a set of procedures that could help our community better understand the series of events that lead up to an accident. The paper I wrote, which (hopefully) explains the process more clearly than I have in this post can be read Here.
I'm posting this here in the hope that some of you might be interested in collaboratively developing this analysis for the benefit of our community. I'm also interested on any input or discussion about whether or not this approach would yield realistic information that would be helpful to the average Northeast Hiker. Any and all input is appreciated
-Andrew