Lost Hiker on Mt Lafayette - FOUND!

[giggy]

I suspect that most of us have missed a turn or made a wrong turn at some point. (I certainly have.) Its what you do next that counts.

even in clear bluebird weather- I am guilty.

 

[Mike P.]

even in clear bluebird weather- I am guilty.

Guilty myself, last April in Catskills of a wrong turn also, the margin for error then was much greater.

Am I right that we don't have any confirmation where they decided to turn around?

 

[Papa Bear]

Here's an amusing story of a dumb wrong turn I made a few years ago backpacking along the AT in Pennsylvania.

Warning: this story involves no life threatening situations and no SAR. But it might lighten up this thread a tiny bit.

http://members.bellatlantic.net/~vze2h6gy/papabear/AT2003_HF_Duncannon.html#day5

 

[DougPaul]

Am I right that we don't have any confirmation where they decided to turn around?

My reading (from the public reports) is that they summited Lafayette, turned south on the ridge, turned around somewhere on the ridge, and then split up . My guess is that they thought they were closer to Lafayette than to Little Haystack when they turned around and their plan would likely have been to descend via Greenleaf Tr. (This sets up the chain of events where the solo victim misses the turn-off and eventually wanders into the upper Pemi.)

It was reported that they went up the Bridal Path and thus must have summited Lafayette via Greenleaf. I have seen no reports identifying exactly where they turned around, which trail they planned to descend or which trail the pair descended, but Greenleaf and Bridal Path seems like a good guess.

Doug

 

[SteveHiker]

just wondering

Sometimes when something like this happens, these long threads tend to occur afterwards. I was wondering if anyone considered whether or not the victim might be a member here. Would that change the tone of the discussion or any of the posts, if you knew that they could read it? Or knew them?

There's no easy way to tell really. Now if it was Kevin Rooney, for example not to single him out, that got lost we'd all read his name in the paper or hear it on the news and know who it was. But if the person who got lost posted under the name "FluffyBunnyFeet", and no one knew his or her real name. Things would be quite different, I expect.

 

[ROCKYSUMMIT]

Stevehiker you may have a point...I also wonder, with the number of members here, how many local people (lurkers?) may be in the mountains in addition to all of us? Don't know how anyone could come up with a number, but I would think most winter hikers would be a part of this site.

 

[sapblatt]

Stevehiker you may have a point...I also wonder, with the number of members here, how many local people (lurkers?) may be in the mountains in addition to all of us? Don't know how anyone could come up with a number, but I would think most winter hikers would be a part of this site.

If it was me I would want to hear what everyone had to say - I wouldnot want it to happen again!
There are far more lurkers than members at VFTT - anytime you look at the "Currently Active Users" on the forum page you can see that - recently it stated 29 members were online and 69 guests.

 

[ROCKYSUMMIT]

Hey Mike, very good point.

 

[Chip]

If it was me I would want to hear what everyone had to say - .

Not me. I took a wrong turn in the Catskills in the fall and specifically did not mention it in my trip report to avoid the "Should ofs" here. I realized what I did wrong and learned from it. This isn't to say I can't learn from hearing about OTHER people's mistakes, though !

I will say this: If VFTT were a TV network it'd be obvious which "segments" would get the highest ratings. Have you compared the views of this thread to, say, Tom & Atticus' recent Trip Report ?

 

[Stan]

Ahhh ... we're now into True Confessions. Well, I can say that I don't remember ever taking a wrong turn ... on the trail at least ... but a couple times I've had the pleasure of following the wash out from a water bar for a good 20 yards and then, after another 20 yards of increasing bushwhack conditions, realized the trail went the wrong way but, being an obliging fellow, I rejoined the trail.

 

[sapblatt]

Not me. I took a wrong turn in the Catskills in the fall and specifically did not mention it in my trip report to avoid the "Should ofs" here. I realized what I did wrong and learned from it. This isn't to say I can't learn from hearing about OTHER people's mistakes, though !

I will say this: If VFTT were a TV network it'd be obvious which "segments" would get the highest ratings. Have you compared the views of this thread to, say, Tom & Atticus' recent Trip Report ?

Well, sadly more people are going to watch a American Idol or a disaster movie than Masterpiece Theater...

 

[sapblatt]

Ahhh ... we're now into True Confessions. Well, I can say that I don't remember ever taking a wrong turn ... on the trail at least ... but a couple times I've had the pleasure of following the wash out from a water bar for a good 20 yards and then, after another 20 yards of increasing bushwhack conditions, realized the trail went the wrong way but, being an obliging fellow, I rejoined the trail.

Stan - LOL

I did that waterbar cut off trick with Bobby last October on the Hincks Trail...he kindly pointed out that I could keep going the way I was going, but he was going to follow the trail!

Truth be told - I have messed up directionally one time enough to scare me...I was coming of Passaconaway and I missed a veer to the left - I ended up in a clearing where a camp used to be - I freaked out for about 20 seconds, then I calmed down and retraced my steps and found a blaze...it was cold and pouring and I really did not want to be lost for the night.

 

[bikehikeskifish]

To be fair to (say) Tom & Atticus, you should divide the number of views by some factor of the number of replies, as each reply (or two or three or ten, depending on your reading frequency) will cause returning eyeballs.

Tim

 

[Dr. Dasypodidae]

My reading (from the public reports) is that they summited Lafayette, turned south on the ridge, turned around somewhere on the ridge, and then split up . My guess is that they thought they were closer to Lafayette than to Little Haystack when they turned around and their plan would likely have been to descend via Greenleaf Tr. (This sets up the chain of events where the solo victim misses the turn-off and eventually wanders into the upper Pemi.)

It was reported that they went up the Bridal Path and thus must have summited Lafayette via Greenleaf. I have seen no reports identifying exactly where they turned around, which trail they planned to descend or which trail the pair descended, but Greenleaf and Bridal Path seems like a good guess.

Doug

I think that DougPaul probably has it right, until further information is available. And if his scenario is correct, then I suggest that the old mountaineering axiom “some times the fastest and safest way is out over the top” (an expression that originated with big routes from the Alps to the Himalaya for avoiding technical retreats) might not have been appropriate on Lafayette. On winter trips in the Whites, “going out over the top” might also be interpreted as meaning “avoid retreating into the wind when above treeline.” So, if indeed the three had already topped out on Lafayette and were heading south on Franconia Ridge, they should have kept going with the worst of the wind to their backs, no matter how far along the ridge, all the way to Little Haystack, from which one can get below treeline on a trail within a few meters. Getting around parts of the summit of Lincoln are tough in high wind, but not as difficult as heading into the wind from the summit of Lafayette.

This same axiom might have applied to Kenny in January 2004 when, from between Bond and West Bond, he tried to hike north into a severely cold wind across the Twinway, which is only very thinly forested for long sections, to South Twin. Instead, he should have either retreated back over Bond Cliff (bushwhacking around the east side rather than going over the top) with the wind at his side, or at least turned tail to wind at Guyot and headed for Zealand, even if he did not know that route so well (according to his cell phone call the previous night).

Ditto for the couple who spent two nights above treeline on Lafayette on Easter weekend in 2004; if they had continued down on the Skoocumchuk Trail, even if they did not know their location or direction of the trail, at least they would have been out of the wind below treeline. Trying to go back out over the top did not work for them.

The axiom also did not work for the three on Mt. Hood this winter, two of whom were trying to avoid the technical difficulties of retreating down the Sandy Headwall on the north side, and in doing so got lost looking for the easier descent route from the summit on the south side. The same can be said for the world’s two foremost female alpinists, Karen McNeil and Sue Nott, who were lost to upper reaches of Mt. Foraker in Alaska last spring.

Coulda, shoulda, woulda.

I am not arguing that bad decisions were not made in venturing onto mountains in deteriorating weather in the first place on Mt. Hood, Foraker, or in the Whites. However, a climbing ranger once said to us in the Tetons that if we spent our time waiting for perfect weather, we would never get up anything. His advice was to go up, keep our options open, and be ready to retreat if necessary. “Going out over the top” is a high-stakes decision, but some times the best of bad alternatives.

The pros (as in professional mountain guides) know the compass bearings for all the bail out points on winter routes in the Whites, such as the Presi traverse (ex. google Chauvin Guides). If the bearings are not written on tape on the back of their compasses, the bearings are probably imprinted on their brains. Mountain guides anywhere do not grow old by luck alone.

I think that this VFTT thread, those that have sprung from this thread, and those that have followed other tragedies in the mountains are an excellent venue for learning, not only for novices, but also for experienced hikers. My suggestion is keep the comments flowing.

 

[DougPaul]

I think that DougPaul probably has it right, until further information is available. And if his scenario is correct, then I suggest that the old mountaineering axiom “some times the fastest and safest way is out over the top” (an expression that originated with big routes from the Alps to the Himalaya for avoiding technical retreats) might not have been appropriate on Lafayette. On winter trips in the Whites, “going out over the top” might also be interpreted as meaning “avoid retreating into the wind when above treeline.” So, if indeed the three had already topped out on Lafayette and were heading south on Franconia Ridge, they should have kept going with the worst of the wind to their backs, no matter how far along the ridge, all the way to Little Haystack, from which one can get below treeline on a trail within a few meters. Getting around parts of the summit of Lincoln are tough in high wind, but not as difficult as heading into the wind from the summit of Lafayette.

One of the things that we do not know is how far they were from Lafayette when they decided to turn back. If they were still very close, heading back out over Lafayette may have been the better route, otherwise heading south may have been the better choice. FWIW, it appears that all 3 were able to make it back to Lafayette summit.

This same axiom might have applied to Kenny in January 2004 when, from between Bond and West Bond, he tried to hike north into a severely cold wind across the Twinway, which is only very thinly forested for long sections, to South Twin. Instead, he should have either retreated back over Bond Cliff (bushwhacking around the east side rather than going over the top) with the wind at his side, or at least turned tail to wind at Guyot and headed for Zealand, even if he did not know that route so well (according to his cell phone call the previous night).

IIRC, he knew the route over South Twin. Familarity can be a powerful lure in bad conditions. Bushwacking down toward Threau Falls Trail might also have been a good option and would have been protected the entire way.

Doug

 

[giggy]

Dr D - I agree 100% with what you are saying, and I hope my point didn't come across as saying - "never bother with compass, etc.."

I guess I was trying to focus more on the root of this particular accident. If we are looking at this accident and what led up to the "situation" - its weather, weather, & more weather. I actually don't even question the call to to head up in it, people do it all the time for various reasons. If you want to take the risk, then this can happen with the most techno advanced gear out there.

I think the Hood (and what I know of the Foraker one too) situation is very different. My take was those guys had reports of the weather and they were making a call to beat the weather and basically be done with the route prior to it moving in. The risk they gambled on and lost was the ablity to get up and down prior to that. One got injured and that was wildcard. based on what i know about these guys and the skill level, - I think that was an appropriate plan and risk to take. It just didn't work out for them - and its a cliche, but thats mountaineering - things like that happen

I totally agree heading at least to treeline is very feasible and was no harm in doing that. But, with the beta around for the weekend weather, and the call to keep going - is what I think should be discussed for this situation.

I don't think the fellow is an idiot, I am far from in expert in anything except beer

I am glad he fared well - considering the ordeal. Maybe i was too harsh, in earlier posts, Maybe this incident did reinforce a few ideas.

 

[Grumpy]

... If we are looking at this accident and what led up to the "situation" - its weather, weather, & more weather. I actually don't even question the call to to head up in it, people do it all the time for various reasons. If you want to take the risk, then this can happen with the most techno advanced gear out there. ...

I agree with this in the main, but observe that two out of the three people in the party returned to the trailhead in due time and in good shape. The third member of the group becoming separated (and lost) remains, in my little head, the key to the whole thing. I continue to think that despite the weather, the odds are we would not be having this internet conversation if the party had not separated.

So, I remain very interested in learning exactly when, where, how and why this group of three got split up. At what point did the members of the party realize the group had become separated?

G.

 

[DougPaul]

So, I remain very interested in learning exactly when, where, how and why this group of three got split up. At what point did the members of the party realize the group had become separated?

My reading of the reports was that splitting up was done by group decision. I am aware of no reports as to why. It is possible that his feet were cold (due to the inadequate boots) and he wanted to rush ahead to warm them sooner (either on the trail (by generating more heat or by getting out of the wind) or in the car).

Doug

 

[Tim Seaver]

Gagnon and his two companions, 23-year-old Ryan Duhaime of Manchester
and 22-year-old Marc Smith of Merrimack, began their hike up Old Bridle
Path, past the Greenleaf Hut.

Their plan was to summit Mount Lafeyette, hike along several miles along
the exposed ridgeline, and then spend the night at Liberty Spring
campsite. After they summitted Lafeyette and walked dead into freezing
60-mph winds, the group decided to turn back. Gagnon went ahead, but
somehow missed the trail junction leading back to Greenleaf Hut.

Smith and Duhaime waited for 90 minutes at Greenleaf before heading down
themselves.

****Speculation Alert****
If this article is correct (keeping in mind that news accounts do not always reflect what really happened), it sounds like Gagnon was ahead after they decided to turn back, then missed the junction atop Lafayette, continuing north on the Garfield Ridge Trail. If the visibility was low, he conceivably wouldn't have to be that far ahead to be out of sight. His partners may have arrived at the summit after he went straight, and taken the left to Greenleaf without realizing that Gagnon had missed the turn, still thinking that he was just ahead of them. I am guessing that once they reached Greenleaf, it finally dawned on them that Gagnon was not ahead, but even then, may have not been sure if he was still headed down the mountain in front of them.

Having been in a few similar situations, I think a few good lessons can be gleaned from this incident. One would be to avoid losing visual contact with the members of your group when encountering high winds and low visibility, and another would be to always stop at any junction if in the lead, to wait for the group to catch up. Of course, when visibility is low, above-treeline junctions are much easier to miss, which may be exactly what happened here.

In any case, I am certainly glad he came out of this incident intact. The SAR folks really shined on this one, here is a hat tip to them all!

 

[giggy]

My reading of the reports was that splitting up was done by group decision. I am aware of no reports as to why. It is possible that his feet were cold (due to the inadequate boots) and he wanted to rush ahead to warm them sooner (either on the trail (by generating more heat or by getting out of the wind) or in the car).

Doug

yep - Great point - hits home the much less margin of error, things go bad very fast in those conditions, etc.. which brings me back to my original point, you got to focus hard and careful to head across an exposed ridge in more or less an arctic hurricane.

and this was mentioned before - but who is to say - they stay together now you got 3 guys out there for 2 nights. At the time, maybe the best call was to seperate. In those winds and cold, there is no time for fumbling around with gear, having 5 minutes group talks, etc.. You make a decsion in 1 second and hope its right.